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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EVAN GARTH WESTENSKOW, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
GLORA WESTENSKOW, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 14436 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a divorce action brought by Appellant against 
Respondent with Respondent filing a Counterclaim against Appellant, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Weber County, the Honorable Ronald 
O. Hyde, presiding, awarded a Decree of Divorce in favor of 
Respondent, awarded Respondent alimony and child support, 
and equitably divided the marital estate in accordance with the 
law and the evidence. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the trial court's 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts does not fully set forth 
the facts established at the trial of this matter by leaving 
out vital testimony having a bearing upon the issues on appeal. 
The parties were married in December, 196 9 (R. 174). 
At the time of the marriage, Appellant was an undergraduate at 
the University of Utah and Respondent was a recent business 
education graduate with a teaching certificate (R. 173-4) . 
Appellant subsequently obtained a degree in marketing in 1972 
(R. 119) . After graduation, Appellant was employed by 
Burroughs Corporation as a marketing representative (R. 120). 
During the time that Appellant was completing his 
schooling, Respondent taught school and did secretarial work 
contributing $13,021.00 to the marriage (R. 174-5) . In addition, 
she brought into the marriage $741.00 in her savings account, 
a 1969 Camaro automobile with an equity value of $3,000.00, her 
life insurance purchased by her parents with a cash value of 
$584.00 and cashed in during the marriage, and a $2,000.00 gift 
from Respondent's parents making a total financial contribution 
into the marriage by Respondent of $19,346.00 (R. 175-76). 
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Two children were born to the parties and were one 
year and two years old at the time of trial (R. 179). In 1974, 
the year prior to the divorce trial, Appellant earned a salary 
from Burroughs Corporation of $17,924.00 (R. 162). The parties 
purchased a new home in 1972 for a sum of $28,600.00 (R. 180). 
In the spring of 1975 Appellant learned that a girl 
he knew in high school had recently been divorced (R. 146-47). 
In March of 1975 Appellant filed the subject divorce proceedings 
and advised Respondent that he did not love her (R. 1 and 184). 
After the parties separated Respondent found a letter from 
Appellant's high school sweetheart indicating "if you ever need 
me here I am" (R. 183). Respondent testified at the trial that 
she did not want the divorce (R. 178). 
About two months prior to trial, Appellant intentionally 
terminated his employment with Burroughs Corporation in August 
of 1975, and incorporated his own business designated as Brute 
of Utah, Incorporated (R. 120 and 123). The business consists 
of a distributorship for an industrial cleaning company (R. 122). 
The business started generating income in September, 1975 (R. 124). 
Two new vans were leased to transport machines to be sold 
and to be used by Appellant and one employee (R. 170). Two weeks 
prior to the trial of this matter, Appellant purchased a 1976 
Pontiac Grand Prix and testified that the purchase of this new 
car would affect his ability to pay alimony and child support 
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during the next five years (R. 15960). At the time of trial, 
Appellant projected his gross income for the next three months 
at $800.00 per month with a net of $680.00 per month (Ex. E). 
The residence of the parties was purchased in 1972 
at a cost of $28,600.00 (R. 180). Its present value at the 
time of trial was between $36,000.00 and $38,000.00 (R. 84 and 
180). The equity in the house was approximately $8,300.00 after 
deducting the first mortgage and 10 percent of the gross value 
for selling costs (R. 84). Respondent was awarded the 
residence subject to a $5,000.00 lien in favor of Appellant 
payable in five years from the date of the Decree, marriage 
of Respondent or at the time Respondent decided to sell the 
residence, whichever came earlier (R. 95). The formula 
followed by the Court was as requested by Appellant (R. 202). 
Respondent had requested the Court to award her the residence 
and all equity therein (Ex. 5). 
Respondent was further awarded all household furniture, 
fixtures and appliances excepting certain items awarded to 
Appellant which will hereafter be itemized (R. 95). Respondent 
was further awarded the 1972 Jeep, one bicycle, sewing machine, 
typewriter, piano and one-half of the stock of the parties in 
Burroughs and McCulloch Oil (R. 95 and Ex. A ) . A one-half 
interest of said stock would be worth approximately $1,6 30.87 
(Ex. A) . 
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Appellan1 recoivt-a ..-no bci" * "^  ••• *: • ';- -u 
chairs, 1976 Pontiac, ono- half of th» shares of. stocK in 
Burroughs and McCulloch Oil, 1974 Gulf Stream boat, 1974 
Yamaha motorcycle, one-sixth interest a- *••• a-.-i'-s : Wayne 
County, IJtal i, all stock transferred to Appellant from his 
grandmother , skis , go] f cli lbs , gi ins , archery set, camera, 
tape deck, and $5,000., 00 lien against the residence of the 
parties (R. 95). Appellant further was awarded commissions 
due from 1 lis former employer i n the amount of $ 1 , 73] 00 
together with all stock in Appellant •.••*. business :•*. '^V, 
Appellant f~; one-sixth interest >n 390 acres :•: 
Wayne County was vaU-t-n i>\ ,*.t \n ii.-«{i *. 
per acre (R. 150). \hi& w^ f-. a vested interest in Appellant 
at the time of trial havinq been cor-^ovod to Appellant &% 
special. Warranty Deed :u' • l r- ana •-,> 
Gifts of stock from Appellantfs grandmother and 
vested in Appellant i L ^  ha MM- . *' > i.i' .• • *- -• 
One-half interest in one share East Mill Creek Water Company, 
100 shares Dynapac, Inc., an undivided one-third interest 
:i n Parker Mountain grazing privileges a- -. ••• r-. :•. vided 
one-third interest in Producers Livestock Marketing 
Association (R. 149, 150, 151, 170, 17 1.,. f.xs 6 -— 'j. 
Respondent was !eqn;« ••: i; -i^.-» i * • _:•-, .e 
first mortgage on the residence in fhe approximate sum 
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of $25,000.00 (R. 95 and 180). Respondent was further 
required to pay the Beckstead Oil Company indebtedness in 
the approximate sum of $300.00 to $400.00 (R. 95 and 182). 
Appellant was required to pay all other outstanding 
indebtedness which included payment of the second mortgage 
on the residence in the sum of $3f000.00 and represented a 
loan for an investment in the publication of a book on gold, 
miscellaneous loans in the total sum of $930.00, and loans 
connected with indebtedness incurred by Appellant in the 
start of his new business (R. 95f 149, Exs. B, C and 2). 
Appellant was further ordered to pay any indebtedness 
owing to his grandmother, if any there be (R. 95 and Ex. B). 
Respondent was awarded alimony in the sum of $75.00 
per month for a period of six months and then to increase to 
$100*00 per month for a period of six months and then to 
increase to $150.00 per month for a period of 4 years and 
then terminate (R. 95). This coincides with the time the youngest 
child will start school. 
Respondent was awarded child support in the sum 
of $75.00 per month per child for a period of 3 months 
after which it increased to $125.00 per month per child 
to remain at that level until Appellant's income reached 
$15,000.00 per year at which time it was to increase to 
$150.00 per month per child. In the event Appellant's 
income reached $18,000.00 per year, child support was 
set at $180.00 per month per child (R. 95). 
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Each party was ordered to pay his and her own 
attorney's fees (R. 95). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT AWARDED BY THE 
COURT AND THE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE 
WAS WITHIN THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW. 
It is with some reluctance that Respondent undertakes 
the task of citing statutory law and case law in the subject case 
because of the frequent appeals in divorce proceedings. Therefore, 
brevity will be the goal. 
The legislature, in 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 
has provided that "...the Court may make such orders in 
relation to the children, property and parties, and the maintenance 
of the parties and children, as may be equitable..." 
In Wilson v. Wilson, 296 P.2d 977, 5 Utah 2d 79, 
involving a wife who was awarded a divorce from a husband who 
was in love with another woman and wanted to marry her, and where 
the court awarded her substantially all of the property possessed 
by the parties, this court observed as follows: 
"Reference to the facts of that case emphasizes 
that no firm rule can be uniformly applied 
in all divorce cases, and that each must be 
determined upon the basis of the immediate 
fact situation." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"The more recent pronouncements of this 
court, and the policy to which we adhere, 
are to the effect that the trial judge has 
considerable latitude of discretion in such 
matters and that his judgment should not 
be changed lightly, and in fact, not at 
all, unless it works such a manifest injustice 
or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse 
of discretion." 
A recent pronouncement of this court in McKean v. 
McKean (1975), 544 P.2d 1238, this court observed as follows: 
"The prior decisions of this court have not 
enunciated a rule that the property of a 
marriage must be divided by some formula nor 
has the court ruled that the wife is entitled 
to a fixed percentage of the husband's income 
as alimony and support money. This court has 
recognized the principle that the trial court 
is entitled to a wide discretion in these 
matters and that discretion is not interfered 
with unless it appears from the record that 
the trial court has abused this discretion." 
As recently as April, 1976, in Leftwich v. Leftwich, 
549 P.2d 447, this court held that the trial court had not 
abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate not in 
accordance with the one-third, two-third formula. 
In McBroom v. McBroom, 384 P.2d 961, 14 Utah 2d 393, 
this court commented on the difficult task the court has in 
trying to look into the future and determine the effect 
that alternative courses of action will have on the lives, 
happiness and well being of the children and observed as follows: 
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"In the instant case, as is usual in child 
custody cases, this court is burdened with the 
dual task of determining not only the equity 
of the property settlement, but also the more 
important, yet uncertain and controversial 
task of trying to look into the future and 
determine the effect which each alternative 
course of action will have on the lives, 
happiness and well being of the children.11 
This is undoubtedly what Judge Hyde had in mind in the 
subject case when he responded to the suggestion by Appellant's 
counsel that the estate should be divided down the middle (R. 201) 
"THE COURT: The only problem with that proposition 
is that it overlooks the interest of these 
children. It is not a two-party matter. It 
is four." 
In the landmark case of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 236 P.2d 
1066, this court, in an opinion written by Justice Crockett, indicated 
that in dividing property and awarding alimony in a divorce case, 
factors to be considered are as follows: 
1. Social position. 
2. Standard of living. 
3. What each gave up for the marriage. 
4. What money or property each brought into the 
marriage, 
5. Ages of the parties. 
6. Physical and mental health. 
7. Relative ability. 
8. Training and education. 
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9. Income of the parties and property acquired. 
10. How property was acquired and efforts of each in 
doing so. 
11. Children to be reared, their ages, and obligations. 
12. Life expectancy. 
13. Extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care given. 
14. Present standards of living and needs of each 
including cost of living. 
The onerous burden of the trial judge, as just described, 
must have been felt by Justice Henroid in the case of Broadbent 
v. Broadbent, 425 P.2d 784, 19 Utah 2d 48, when he observed: 
"The veil of mathematical data woven by 
both sides as to assets and income, effect-
ively and with commendable common sense, 
were pierced by a sabre wielded by a 
practical, logical and humanly compre-
hending conclusion." 
This, we contend, was the duty attempted and accomplished 
by Judge Hyde in the subject case. His first consideration was 
to the children in keeping them in a home and providing them 
with the bare necessities of life. 
The judge's next concern was balancing the interests 
of the husband and wife as best he could. 
Alimony and child support started out at nominal 
sums with the court considering that Appellant's business was 
in its infancy. 
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Appellan hasi realized $600.00 gross in the first full 
month of operation and anticipated that the next three months 
would be $800.00 gross ner month. The court further considered that 
Appellant was able to afford a $175.00 per month apartment, 
two new vans for his business and a 1976 Pontiac Grand Prix two 
weeks before trial. 
Appellant in his Answers to Interrogatories, signed 
one month before trial, indicated that his monthly living 
expenses were $839.00 (R. 46 and 163). Respondent testified 
that the living expenses per month for her and the two 
children were $600.00 (R. 178 and Ex. 4). 
The trial court, using a conservative and equitable 
approach, provided for Appellant to pay only $225.00 for the 
maintenance of Respondent and her two children for the first 
three months following the trial. For the next three months, 
Appellant was ordered to pay the total sum of $325.00. For 
the following six months, Appellant was ordered to pay $350.00 
and then the total sum of $400.00 for four years unless his 
income reached $15,000.00. It hardly seems that Appellant is 
the victim of a harsh and unconscionable trial judge. 
Appellant argues strenuously that graduated increases 
for alimony and child support are improper. Appellant argues 
that a fixed sum should be set and later proceedings used 
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if circumstances warrant. It is true that this is one option 
that the trial court has. However, there is another option 
available, i.e. the option of providing increases in alimony 
and child support based upon increases in the income of 
Appellant. In either case, either party has the option of 
petitioning the court to change the award if the circumstances 
warrant such change. 
This situation was faced by the Court of Appeals of 
Oregon In the Matter of the Dissolution of the MARRIAGE OF 
Patricia Ann TYERMAN (1975) 534 P.2d 998, where the husband 
appealed from a decree awarding to the wife $150.00 per 
month for support of each of the parties four children and 
$500.00 per month for support of the wife for ten years and 
then $300.00 per month indefinitely. The court, in holding 
that this formula was proper, observed as follows: 
"We think the evidence is too indefinite 
to be assured what husband's income will 
be after two years in the service. 
"If what counsel asserts proves to be so, 
an adjustment probably should be made in 
two years in the amount of the wife's 
support. The indefiniteness of the 
evidence appears to reflect as much an inability 
to determine what the husband's pay will be 
in two years as it does a failure to produce 
available evidence. Hence a determination 
of what the payments should be then may 
be determined by future unpredictable events. 
"We do not find that any of the court's 
decree with reference to disposition of 
property was improper. Therefore, we affirm 
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the court's decree but observe that, if 
the husband's income drops as his counsel 
forecasts it will in two years, that will 
be a change of circumstances which will 
then justify a reappraisal of the amount of 
support for the wife if proper motion is 
made therefor." 
Judge Hyde was faced with Appellant's new business 
and the reasonably good prospects of substantial income in 
the future and he chose a similar formula as the trial judge 
did in the Oregon case. 
In Berg v. Berg (1967), 434 P.2d 1, the Supreme 
Court of Washington held similarly to the Oregon court and 
held that an alimony award to the wife of $375.00 per month 
until June 30, 1966, and thereafter of $200.00 per month 
until July 1, 1971, was proper. 
It is axiomatic that it is a common practice among 
attorneys to provide for various levels of alimony and child 
support as they relate to fluctuations in the husband's 
earnings level. This procedure provides flexibility and a safeguard 
against future litigation when the earnings of the husband reach 
higher levels and it is obvious that the needs of the wife 
and children are at least the amount ordered or agreed upon. 
The claim of Appellant that Respondent received 85 
percent of the marital assets is surprising and inaccurate. Appellant 
asked for a $5,000.00 lien on the residence of the parties 
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and was granted this by the court with a limit in years when 
said lien was to be paid. No purpose would be served in 
reiterating the division of the marital estate except to say 
that each party paid his own attorney's fees, Respondent 
received the household furniture and appliances and Appellant 
received the new car, the new business, virtually all recreational 
equipment including Gulf Stream boat and motorcycle, etc., and 
the one-sixth interest in the 390 acres in Wayne County. 
The bulk of the indebtedness Appellant assumed was 
business indebtedness as shown by Exhibits B and C. This is 
particularly the case when one realizes that Respondent assumed 
the first mortgage on the residence in the sum of $25,107.00. 
Further, the trial court was not disposed to burden Respondent 
with paying back the $3,000.00 invested in the publication 
of a book on gold, or the questionable indebtedness to 
Appellant's grandmother. 
Appellant argues that he was put upon by the trial 
court in that the court gave Respondent everything she asked 
for including the payment of a debt owing to the Bank of Utah 
which was not in the record. On the contrary, the indebtedness 
to the Bank of Utah was referred to in Appellant's testimony 
at page 131 of the Record wherein Appellant testified in part 
as follows: 
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"A. Notes payable to banks is to the Bank of 
Utah, a six month note that I acquired to make 
the initial purchase of the business." 
The court is further referred to Plaintiff's Answers 
to Defendant's Interrogatories wherein in the answer to 
Interrogatory No. 20 Appellant listed the Bank of Utah as 
a creditor (R. 46). 
Appellant urges that Respondent was awarded everything 
she asked for which, of course, is not so. Respondent 
requested the court to award the residence of the parties 
to her including all equity. She also requested the court 
to award child support in the sum of $200.00 per month per 
child and alimony in the sum of $200.00 per month. None of 
these were granted by the court. 
It is interesting to note that Appellant requests 
the court to divide the marital estate on a 50 percent - 50 
percent basis when none of the Exhibits he submitted to the 
court contained the Wayne County property or the corporate 
stock incident thereto. While advocating that everything be 
divided down the middle, Appellant was not willing to include 
the Wayne County property as indicated at pages 203-4 of the Record 
as follows: 
"Q. Would you also be willing to give her 
half of the Wayne County property when that 
is sold? 
"A. No. I have no idea what that is." 
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A shortcut through this maze of data and argument 
can be had by referring to the trial court's Memorandum Decision 
(R. 66) and the trial court's Memorandum Decision Regarding 
Plaintiff's Request for Reconsideration (R. 84). The trial 
judge observed: 
1. Appellant had quit a job paying $18,000.00 a 
year to go into business himself. 
2. That certain expenses could be placed into 
Appellant's new business thereby minimizing his net income. 
For example, a 1976 Pontiac to be paid by the business. 
3. That a 50-50 division of the property would make 
sense except for the needs of the two minor children of tender 
years. 
4. That Respondent is unable to immediately take 
employment commensurate with her training in education. 
5. That Appellant's suggestions would immediately 
place Respondent and the children at a poverty level to get 
by the best way they could while Appellant goes on his way. 
6. That it was obvious under the circumstances that 
the Respondent needed assistance by way of alimony. 
7. That in distributing the property, the children 
were entitled to something better than some cheap apartment. 
8. That each party could pay their own attorney's 
fees out of the stock that was equally divided. 
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9. That Appellant, in his Request for Reconsideration, 
did exactly as he did in court. That he totally ignored the 
interests and the needs of the two children. 
10. That the interests of the children come before 
either of the parties. 
11. That the exhibits of Appellant are on the basis 
that Respondent is a school teacher. That the evidence before 
the court was that Respondent was giving piano lessons with a 
monthly income of approximately $200.00. 
12. That Appellant ignores the interests of the children 
and would penalize them by dumping them in a nursery school. 
That Respondent is to be commended for her attempts to grant 
the children of tender years a parent's care in placing their 
interests before her own pecuniary gain. 
13. That Appellant's position is unreasonable, i.e. 
Appellant's Schedule (A) lists Appellant's food cost at exactly 
the same figure as food costs for the Respondent and the two 
children. That the Appellant does the same thing with the clothing 
cost. 
14. That the court valued the home at $37,000.00 and 
found an equity of $8,300.00 after deducting the first mortgage 
and a 10 percent factor for selling costs. 
15. That considering Appellant's lien of $5,000.00, 
Respondent received $3,300.00 and not the figure of $9,500.00 
as set out in Appellant's Schedule (G). 
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16. That the $3,000.00 second mortgage on the 
residence was a bad investment and Appellant should suffer 
the loss. 
17. That one of the reasons Appellant received a 
$5,000.00 lien on the residence was the obligation to Appellant's 
grandmother which the court questions will ever even be paid. 
18. That Appellant's loss to determine how the court 
reached the result it did will probably always remain so long 
as Appellant interprets the action as involving only two parties. 
19. That Respondent and her two children have been 
reduced to a proverty level by this divorce. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the action of the 
trial court in the awarding of alimony and child support and 
the division of the marital estate was well within the evidence 
and the applicable legal principles and that the same should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD H. THORNLEY 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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